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Two kinds of probability expressions, verbal and numerical, have been used to
characterize the uncertainty that people face. However, the question of whether verbal
and numerical probabilities are cognitively processed in a similar manner remains
unresolved. From a levels-of-processing perspective, verbal and numerical probabilities
may be processed differently during early sensory processing but similarly in later
semantic-associated operations. This event-related potential (ERP) study investigated
the neural processing of verbal and numerical probabilities in risky choices. The results
showed that verbal probability and numerical probability elicited different N1 amplitudes
but that verbal and numerical probabilities elicited similar N2 and P3 waveforms in
response to different levels of probability (high to low). These results were consistent with
a levels-of-processing framework and suggest some internal consistency between the
cognitive processing of verbal and numerical probabilities in risky choices. Our findings
shed light on possible mechanism underlying probability expression and may provide
the neural evidence to support the translation of verbal to numerical probabilities (or vice
versa).
Keywords: risky choice, verbal probability, numerical probability, ERP
INTRODUCTION
We live in an uncertain world. Daily, people have to make decisions under uncertainty because they
usually cannot control all the factors influencing the consequences of their decisions. Two kinds of
probability expressions, verbal and numerical, have been used to characterize the uncertainty that
we face. The verbal mode of probability expressions has a long history and has been considered
the more natural system for processing probabilistic information (Zimmer, 1984). The numerical
mode of probability expressions was first invented by legal scholars and later connected to the
mathematical games of chance in the seventeenth century (Shafer, 1988). Numerical probability
was suggested to be more accurate and to leave less room for subjective interpretation (Bonnefon
and Villejoubert, 2006). The emergence of numerical probability enabled the development of
Bayesian analysis.
Previous studies have shown that verbal and numerical probabilities differ in a number of ways
(Wallsten et al., 1993). For example, numeric probability tends to elicit deliberate and rule-based
reasoning from respondents, whereas verbal probability allows for more associative and intuitive
thinking (Windschitl and Wells, 1996). There are two kinds of verbal probabilities denoting
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uncertainty: positive, suggesting the occurrence of a target
outcome, and negative, drawing attention to its nonoccurrence
(Teigen and Brun, 1999, 2000). Verbal probability distinguishes
external attributions of uncertainty (disposition) from internal
attributions of uncertainty (ignorance) (Kahneman and Tversky,
1982). People interpret verbal probability in a self-serving
manner: verbal probabilities tend to be interpreted as denoting
a higher or lower probability when they are used to describe the
likelihood of pleasant or unpleasant events in one’s own future
than when they are used to describe the likelihood of pleasant or
unpleasant events in someone else’s future (Smits and Hoorens,
2005). Verbal probability seems to be the preferred way to express
animate uncertainty, whereas numerical probability seems to be
the preferred way to express inanimate uncertainty (Du et al.,
2013).
However, behavioral analyses have indicated that people
remain consistent between the two modes of response.
By comparing numerical and non-numerical expressions
of uncertainty, researchers have found that both types of
expressions of uncertainty contain subjective magnitude
information and that similar processes are involved in
manipulating and comparing numerical and verbal terms
(Jaffe-Katz et al., 1989). Vague meanings of probability (verbal
probability) can be directly mapped into a 0–1 interval of
probabilities (Wallsten et al., 1986; Reagan et al., 1989;
Clark, 1990). In a study which asked participants to rate
the attractiveness of lotteries based on previously equated verbal
and numerical descriptors, both modes of judging uncertainty
yielded reliable, internally consistent scales that demonstrated
construct validity at the level of individual subjects (Budescu
et al., 1988).
Behavioral evidence is indirect in nature and leaves
unresolved the question of whether the cognitive processing
of verbal and numerical probabilities is similar. The levels-of-
processing framework suggests that an episodic memory trace
may be thought of as an automatic by-product of operations
carried out by the cognitive system and that the durability
of the trace is a positive function of the depth of processing,
where ‘‘depth’’ refers to greater degrees of semantic involvement
(Craik and Tulving, 1975). Verbal and numerical probabilities
are different modes of assessing uncertainty, but they are
similar in that they both present uncertainty. According to the
levels-of-processing concept, the processing of probability can
be divided into two steps, early sensory processing and later
semantic-associated operations. In the early sensory processing
period, differences in the modes of probability expression
(verbal or numerical) may affect the processing of uncertainty.
In the later semantic-associated operations, the two different
modes of probability expression could have attained some
degree of consistency in their response at any given level of
probability.
So far, a number of functional magnetic resonance (fMRI)
studies have been conducted to investigate the neural basis of
probability in risky decision making. Activation of the cortical
medial prefrontal cortex, lateral prefrontal cortex, posterior
parietal cortex, and insular cortices have been reported to be
correlated with probability (Rogers et al., 1999; Paulus et al.,
2003; Huettel et al., 2005, 2006; Knutson et al., 2005; Weber and
Huettel, 2008; Smith et al., 2009; Mohr et al., 2010). However,
due to the limited time resolution, fMRI technique is unable to
distinguish two stages of probability processing if the signal is
rapidly decaying over time (Kiefer, 2005).
In contrast, the high time resolution of the event-related
potential (ERP) technique in cognitive neuroscience allows
scientists to observe human brain activity that reflects specific
cognitive processes over time (Pirtošek et al., 2009). Thus, in
the present study we investigated the neural processing of verbal
and numerical probabilities by exploiting the high temporal
resolution of ERP recordings.
Studies in human subjects have shown that ERPs in the
frontocentral regions of the scalp elicited more negative ERP
deflections in high-risk situations than in low-risk ones in
a 300–500 ms time window (Yang et al., 2007; Yang and
Zhang, 2011). Using the Iowa Gambling Task, researchers
found that high impulsive decision makers had a larger P3
than low impulsive decision makers (Martin and Potts, 2009).
A recent study used magnetoencephalography to investigate
the brain activity related to numerical probability and value
information in decision-making (Steffen et al., 2011). They found
that value information differentially affected detectable cortical
responses in less than 150 ms, whereas activity did not vary as
a function of probability information until 215 ms. Value and
probability manipulations also differed in the extent of their
anatomical and temporal impact: whereas the activity sensitive
to value was confined to the bilateral temporoparietal region
of interest (ROI) and ended quickly (230 ms), the activity
sensitive to probability was more sustained and involved a
cascade of three ROIs, spreading from the temporoparietal to
the frontotemporal to the frontal ROI in about 100 ms. No
value-probability interactions were observed. In combination,
these findings indicate that value and probability play distinct
roles in the first few 100 ms of processing, that they involve
somewhat different parts of the brain at different times, and
that they contribute additively rather than interactively to
decision-making, at least of the sort assessed in the present
task.
The existing ERP data about the time course of probability
processing has been largely inconclusive but suggests that
probability processing during risky decision-making may largely
be carried out after 200 ms. Similarly, previous works on levels-
of-processing framework have indicated that the representation
mode affected the early sensory processing period about 100 ms
after onset of stimulus and that the semantic meaning affected
the later semantic-associated period about 200 ms after onset
of stimulus (Dehaene, 1996). Thus, if similar processes are
employed in manipulating and comparing numerical and
verbal terms, we could expect that the representation mode of
probability would affect the early period (100 ms) and that the
level of probability would affect the later period (200 ms and
later), independent of the representation mode.
In addition, according to the additive factors concept
(Sternberg, 1969), which argued that if two factors affected
different and independent stages of processing then the effect
of varying one factor must be the same regardless of the level
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of the second factor, we hypothesized that if the processing of
probability could be divided into two stages, there should be no
significant interaction effect between representation mode and
level of probability on the behavioral measures [i.e., percentage
of risky choices and reaction time (RT)].
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-five healthy undergraduate and graduate students
(13 male, age = 21.9 ± 1.31) from China Agricultural University
and Beijing Forestry University took part in the experiments.
They were healthy with no past history of psychiatric or
neurological disease and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Each participant provided written informed consent
before the experiment. The study was approved by the
Institutional Review Board of the Institute of Psychology, the
Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Materials
The participants were asked to choose between a certain
option and a risky option. The certain option always yielded
a sure outcome (CNY 10). The risky option offered a
probability of a larger reward (CNY 20, 30, or 40). There
were three levels of probability: low, medium, and high. At
each level of probability, the outcomes for the risky option
were fixed (CNY 20, 30, or 40). Two kinds of probability
expressions, verbal and numerical, were used to characterize
the probability. According to the work reported by Mohr
et al. (2010), the mean numerical equivalents assigned for
Chinese verbal probabilistic expressions of the low possibility,
medium possibility, and high possibility were 20.41%, 52.52%,
and 78.22%. Here, in the numerical probability expression, the
three levels of probability were 20%, 50%, and 80%. In the
verbal probability expression, the corresponding three levels of
probability were low possibility, medium possibility, and high
possibility.
Procedure
Figure 1 shows the task process. Because the certain option was
always CNY 10 in all trials, only the risky option was displayed
on the screen to prevent interfering stimuli from affecting the
perception of probability. In each trial, the participants were
presented with a risky option and had to decide whether to accept
or reject the risky option. If they rejected it, the participants
would definitely receive CNY 10.
A single trial consisted of the following sequence: initially,
a fixation was displayed in the center of the screen for
1100–1300 ms, followed by the presentation of the corresponding
outcome of the risky option for 1000 ms; another fixation was
then displayed for 1100–1300 ms, followed by the presentation
of the corresponding probability of that risky option. Participants
were asked to decide whether to accept or reject the risky option
by pressing one of two buttons on a keyboard. The participants
completed 486 trials (81 trials in each condition), divided into
seven blocks of 72 or 54 trials each. The participants were
informed that they would be paid CNY 50 for participating. To
further incentivize their cooperation, they were also told that
at the end of the experiment, one choice would be randomly
selected to be played for real. Each participant was paid CNY
50–90 (∼8–15 US dollars) for participating in the experiment.
The participants were instructed to keep their eyes focused
on the center of the screen and to avoid unnecessary body and
eye movements. The outcome stimuli were 2.4 cm in width and
0.8 cm in height. The risky option stimuli were 2.4 cm in width
and 2.0 cm in height. The stimuli were presented in white against
a black background at a distance of 70 cm, subtending a visual
angle smaller than 5◦. Eighteen practice trials were run in the first
session to familiarize the participants with the task. The E-prime
software was used to generate the visually presented problems
(trials).
Electrophysiological Recordings
We used a 64-channel Neuroscan to explore the specific cortical
activity of electroencephalogram (EEG) signal. The EEG was
recorded from 64 scalp sites according to the International
10–20 system using Ag/AgCl electrodes. Vertical and horizontal
ocular movements were also recorded. Eye blinks were recorded
from left supraorbital and infraorbital electrodes. The horizontal
electrooculogram was recorded from electrodes placed 1.5 cm
lateral to the left and right external canthi. All electrode
recordings were referenced to an electrode placed on the left
mastoid, and the impedance was maintained below 5 kΩ.
The EEG was recorded using a band-pass of 0.1–100 Hz and
digitized at a sampling rate of 500 Hz. The EEG data were re-
referenced off-line to linked mastoid electrodes by subtracting
from each data sample recorded at each channel one-half the
activity recorded at the right mastoid. EEG epochs of 1000 ms
(with a 100 ms prestimulus baseline) were extracted off-line for
stimulus-locked ERPs when the risky options were presented.
The data were baseline-corrected by subtracting from each
sample the average activity of that channel during the baseline
period. Trials with a voltage exceeding ±100 µV, relative to
the 100 ms baseline, at any electrode were excluded from
analysis, as were trials with artifacts in the electroocculograph
channels. After excluding the trials that contained electrical
artifacts, at least 71 trials remained in each condition for each
participant.
Data Analysis
Behavioral Data
The RTs were examined using 2 (probability expressions: verbal,
numerical) × 3 (level of probability: low, medium, high)
using repeated measures ANOVAs. The percentages of risky
choices were examined by 2 (probability expressions: verbal,
numerical) × 3 (level of probability: low, medium, high) using
repeated measures ANOVAs.
ERP Data
Because the midline electrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, POz,
and Oz) have been reported to be related to risky decision
making (Yang et al., 2007; Yang and Zhang, 2011), the ERP
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental design with an example of the sequence and timing of stimuli in a typical trial.
data were analyzed by performing 2 (probability expressions)
× 3 (level of probability) × 7 (electrode) repeated-measures
ANOVAs on the ERPs at seven electrodes. Visual inspection of
the waveforms suggested a difference in the N1, N2, and P3
amplitudes between the conditions. The ERP data were analyzed
by computing the mean amplitude in the 70–130 ms (N1),
250–330 ms (N2), and 340–550 ms (P3) time windows after
the probability presentation. Mauchly’s test was used to test
the sphericity assumption of the repeated measures ANOVA,
and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used in cases where
violations of sphericity were found. All statistical tests were two-
sided and had an alpha level of 0.05.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Table 1 shows the RT results and the percentage of risky
choices under each condition. The 2 (probability expression) ×
3 (level of probability) repeated measures ANOVAs conducted
on the RT revealed a significant main effect of probability
expression, F(1,24) = 25.55, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.52; and a
significant main effect of level of probability, F(2,48) = 10.04,
p = 0.001, η2 = 0.30. The interaction was not significant.
Post hoc LSD analyses revealed that participants took a longer
time in the verbal probability condition than in the numerical
probability condition (p < 0.001). The RT in the high level
of probability condition was significantly shorter than in the
TABLE 1 | Mean reaction time and the percentage of risky choices under
each condition (N = 25).
Presentation Level of RT (ms) (SD) Percentage of risky
mode probability choice (SD)
Verbal Low 748.3 (277.0) 0.14 (0.19)
Medium 739.5 (314.4) 0.76 (0.26)
High 663.2 (237.9) 0.92 (0.19)
Low 708.7 (240.2) 0.13 (0.22)
Numerical Medium 712.4 (325.0) 0.76 (0.26)
High 612.7 (215.3) 0.99 (0.02)
low (p < 0.001) and medium (p = 0.003) levels of probability,
with no significant difference between the latter two conditions
(p = 0.92).
A 2 (probability expression)× 3 (level of probability) repeated
measures ANOVAs conducted on the percentage of risky
choices revealed a significant main effect of level of probability,
F(2,48) = 192.33, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.89. No other significant effect
was found. Post hoc LSD analyses revealed that the participants
chose the least risky options in the low-possibility condition and
the highest in the high possibility condition with the medium
possibility intermediate between these (ps < 0.001).
ERP Results
N1 Component (70–130 ms)
A 2 (probability expression) × 3 (level of probability) × 7
(electrode) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of electrode, F(6,144) = 7.61, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.24.
A post hoc LSD analysis revealed the N1 amplitude at Oz to be
greater than that at any other electrode (ps< 0.01). The ANOVA
also revealed a significant interaction effect between electrode
and probability expression, F(6,144) = 12.77, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.35.
A simple effect analysis indicated that the N1 amplitude elicited
by the verbal probability was greater than that elicited by the
numerical probability at the Oz electrode (p = 0.001; Figure 2),
but the opposite pattern was observed at the Fz electrode
(p = 0.03). No other effect was significant.
N2 Component (250–330 ms)
A 2 (probability expression) × 3 (level of probability) × 7
(electrode) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of level of probability, F(2,48) = 5.23, p = 0.01,
η2 = 0.18. A post hoc LSD analysis revealed that the N2 amplitude
elicited by the low level of probability was greater than that
elicited by the high level of probability (p = 0.001). Repeated
measures ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of
electrode, F(6,144) = 17.45, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.42. A post hoc
LSD analysis showed that the N2 amplitude was greater at the
Oz electrode than at the other electrodes (ps < 0.01) and that
the N2 amplitudes were smaller at the Pz and CPz electrodes
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FIGURE 2 | Averaged event-related potential (ERP) waveforms (n = 25)
elicited by verbal and numerical probability at the Oz electrode.
than at other electrodes (ps < 0.05). In addition, the interaction
between electrode and probability expression was significant,
F(6,144) = 6.22, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.21. A simple effect analysis
revealed that the N2 amplitude elicited by the verbal probability
was more negative than the amplitude elicited by the numerical
probability at the FCz, Cz, and CPz electrodes (ps < 0.05;
Figure 3). No other effect was significant.
P3 Component (340–550 ms)
A 2 (probability expression) × 3 (level of probability) × 7
(electrode) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant
interaction effect between electrode and level of probability,
F(12,288) = 3.49, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.13. A simple effect analysis
revealed that the amplitude elicited by the high level of
probability was more positive than that elicited by the low level of
probability at the Pz and POz electrodes (ps < 0.05). A repeated
measures ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of
electrode, F(6,144) = 52.97, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.69. A post hoc
LSD analysis revealed that the amplitude at the Oz electrode
was smaller than at the other electrodes (ps < 0.001) and that
the amplitudes at the Pz and CPz electrodes were greater than
the ones at other electrodes (ps < 0.01). The main effect of
probability expression was significant, F(1,24) = 6.42, p = 0.02,
η2 = 0.21. A post hoc LSD analysis revealed that the amplitude
elicited by numerical probability was more positive than that
elicited by verbal probability. The interaction between electrode
and probability expression was significant, F(6,144) = 6.01,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.13. A simple effect analysis indicated that the
amplitude elicited by numerical probability was more positive
than that elicited by verbal probability at the Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz,
and Pz electrodes (ps < 0.05; Figure 3).
To discern whether the N2 and P3 components represented
a process of probability perception, the correlation between the
behavioral data and the ERP data was analyzed. The change
in the percentage of risky choices between the high level of
probability and the low level of probability was calculated for
each participant. Accordingly, the changes in the amplitude
of the N2 and P3 data were calculated. Then the correlations
between the changes in the percentage of risky choices and those
FIGURE 3 | Averaged ERP waveforms (n = 25) elicited by the level of
probability in the verbal and numerical probability conditions at the
FCz and Pz electrodes.
changes in the N2 and P3 amplitudes were assessed. Table 2
shows the results of this correlation analysis. Results showed that
the change in the amplitude of N2 showed a positive correlation
with the change in percentage of risky choice at the Fz and FCz
electrodes (Figures 4, 5). The change in the P3 amplitude showed
a positive correlation with the change in the percentage of risky
choice at the Pz and POz electrodes (Figures 4, 5).
DISCUSSION
The RT results showed no significant interaction effect between
the probability expression and the level of probability. In
accordance with the additive factors concept (Sternberg, 1969),
the non-significant interaction that observed here indicated
that the processing of probability could be divided into two
stages: an early one, which was affected by the probability
expression, and a later one, which was affected by the level of
probability. This result also supported the hypothesis that the
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TABLE 2 | Spearman correlation between risky choice and ERP
amplitudes.
Difference in N2 (250–330 ms) amplitude between
high and low levels of probability
Fz FCz Cz CPz Pz Poz
Difference in 0.412∗ 0.436∗ 0.303 0.332 0.277 0.146
percentage between
high and low levels
of probability
Difference in P3 (340–550 ms) amplitude between
high and low levels of probability
Fz FCz Cz CPz Pz POz
Difference in 0.199 0.197 0.247 0.367 0.484∗ 0.477∗
percentage between
high and low levels
of probability
Note: ∗denotes p < 0.05.
probability expression was processed before 100 ms but the level
of probability was processed after 200 ms.
Consistent with the levels-of-processing framework
advocated by Craik and Lockhart (1972), the ERP results
provide further evidence for similar processing of verbal and
numerical probabilities. The time sensitivity of the ERP revealed
that verbal probability and numerical probability elicited
different N1 amplitudes but similar N2 and P3 waveforms.
First, the N1 amplitude (culminating at 100 ms post-onset)
at the Oz electrode showed a significant difference between
the verbal and numerical probability expressions, suggesting
that only the notation character was processed during the early
stage of probability processing (100 ms). Level of probability
was not found to have any effect during this stage. Previous
works have demonstrated that the visual N1 component reflects
the operation of a discrimination process within the focus of
attention, including pattern recognition and color- and form-
based discrimination (Ritter et al., 1983; Vogel and Luck, 2000;
Hopf et al., 2002). Consistent with a previous ERP study
conducted using Arabic digits, Chinese numerals written in
simple form, and Chinese numerals written in complex form
served as stimuli (Cao et al., 2010), our finding suggest that the
N1 component was reported to be modulated by the presence of
the three types of stimuli.
Second, the N2 amplitude elicited by the high level of
probability was more negative than that elicited by the low
level of probability, suggesting that the N2 component presents
an abstract meaning of probability, rather than the denoting a
specific expression of probability. Previous works have suggested
that the N2 component probably indexes conflict monitoring,
with more negative N2 amplitudes indicating higher levels of
conflict (Bartholow et al., 2005; Azizian et al., 2006; Folstein and
Van Petten, 2008; Mennes et al., 2008). In an ERP study on risky
decision making, an enhanced (more negative) N2 amplitude
was elicited by a higher level of conflict (Yang et al., 2007;
Mennes et al., 2008). In the present study, results showed that
the N2 amplitude elicited by the low level of probability was
greater than that elicited by the high level of probability. This
might indicate that the conflict observed under low-probability
conditions was greater than that at medium and high levels of
probability. The fact that the N2 amplitude elicited by the verbal
probability was more negative than that elicited by the numerical
FIGURE 4 | Correlations between the behavioral data and the ERP data.
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FIGURE 5 | Topographic distributions of the amplitude differences (low
probability minus high probability) of the N2 and P3 in the range of
250–330 ms and 340–550 ms.
probability at the FCz, Cz, and CPz electrodes may be due to the
notation effect found in the N1 component.
Third, the amplitude elicited by the high level of probability
was more positive than the one elicited by the low level of
probability at the Pz and POz electrodes, indicating that the
posterior P3 was involved in the processing of probability level.
Previous studies have shown that the P3 is activated when
the detection of a stimulus engages the joint operation of
attention and working memory (Kok, 2001; Polich, 2007). The
low level of probability indicated a higher risk. Consistent with
the results of N2, this finding suggested that higher risk required
more cognitive capacity or effect to process the probability
information.
Finally, a correlation was observed between the P3 component
and the percentage of risky choices at the Pz and POz
electrodes. The greater P3 amplitude observed at the high
level of probability than at the low level of probability was
found to lead to a correspondingly higher percentage of risky
choices (Figure 4). The correlation between the N2 component
and the level of probability was observed at the Fz and
FCz electrodes. The more pronounced negative N2 amplitude
observed at the low level of probability was found to lead to a
lower corresponding percentage of risky choice. The correlation
between the behavioral and ERP data provided further evidence
that the anterior N2 and posterior P3 components indeed
represented a process of probability perception rather than a
notation of probability.
Taken together, the RT and the electrophysiological results
indicate the existence of two processing stages with identifiable
neural substrates, stimulus identification and semantic access,
in probability perception during decision making. In the early
sensory processing period, the different modes of probability
expression (verbal or numerical) affected the ERP waveforms. In
the later semantic-associated operations, the different modes of
probability expression showed some degree of consistency at any
given level of probability.
Ever since numerical probability in its modern form emerged
in the 1600s, it has had two faces, frequentist and Bayesian
(Fienberg, 2006; Hacking, 2006). Bayesian analysis has found
widespread use in a sweeping array of scientific disciplines. Even
12-month-old infants show an ability for pure reasoning in terms
of probabilistic inference (Téglás et al., 2011). So far, researchers
have not found any evidence for Bayesian inference using verbal
probability. The finding of the present work that verbal and
numerical probabilities have some level of neuro-consistency
may suggest that people may actually make Bayesian inferences
during verbal processing.
Turning back to the question put at the beginning, regarding
whether the cognitive processing of verbal and numerical
probabilities is similar, the current findings provide neural
evidence that there is internal consistency between verbal
and numerical probabilities. Specifically, they support a view
of a two-stage probability processing in which verbal and
numerical probabilities are first translated into a common metric
and then the semantic meaning of probability (high vs. low)
is considered.
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